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Purpose - As cyber-attacks continue to grow, organisations adopting the internet-of-things (IoT) have continued to react to security concerns that 
threaten their businesses within the current highly competitive environment. Many recorded industrial cyber-attacks have successfully beaten technical 
security solutions by exploiting human-factor vulnerabilities related to security knowledge and skills, and manipulating human elements into 
inadvertently conveying access to critical industrial assets. Knowledge and skill capabilities contribute to human analytical proficiencies for enhanced 
cybersecurity readiness.  Thus, a human-factored security endeavour is required to investigate the capabilities of the human constituents (workforce) to 
appropriately recognise and respond to cyber intrusion events within the industrial control system (ICS) environment.  
Methodology - A quantitative approach (statistical analysis) is adopted to provide an approach to quantify the potential cybersecurity capability 
aptitudes of industrial human actors, identify the least security-capable workforce in the operational domain with the greatest susceptibility likelihood 
to cyber-attacks (i.e., weakest link), and guide the enhancement of security assurance. To support these objectives, a Human-factored Cyber Security 
Capability Evaluation approach is presented using conceptual analysis techniques.  
Findings - Using a test scenario, the approach demonstrates the capacity to proffer an efficient evaluation of workforce security knowledge and 
skills capabilities, and the identification of weakest link in the workforce.  
Practical Implications - The approach can enable organisations to gain better workforce security perspectives like security-consciousness, 
alertness, and response aptitudes, thus guide organisations into adopting strategic means of appropriating security remediation outlines, scopes, and 
resources without undue wastes or redundancies. 
Originality/value – This work demonstrates originality by providing a framework and computational approach for characterising and quantify 
human-factor security capabilities based on security knowledge and security skills. It also supports the identification of potential security weakest links 
amongst an evaluated industrial workforce (human agents), some key security susceptibility areas, and relevant control interventions. The model and 
validation results demonstrate the application of action research. The study demonstrates originality by illustrating how action research can be applied 
within socio-technical dimensions to solve recurrent and dynamic problems related to industrial environment cyber security improvement. It provides 
value by demonstrating how theoretical security knowledge (awareness) and practical security skills can help resolve cyber security response and control 
uncertainties within industrial organisations. 
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1! Introduction 
Cybersecurity in industry control system (ICS) environments has become a growing issue of both national and global 
security over the last decade. The evolving information technology – operation technology (IT-OT) convergence now 
implies that organisations, firms, industries, and factories, embracing the much-acclaimed industry 4.0 and industrial 
internet-of-things (IIoT) paradigms, are reliant on IT infrastructures, open standards and technologies, and the internet 
(Knowles et al., 2015). It also means that these organisational platforms are susceptible to cyber threats, vulnerabilities, 
and attacks. ICS is an all-purpose (common) term used to describe various types of automated industrial systems that 
control, monitor, and manage industrial processes (Macaulay and Singer, 2012; Stouffer et al., 2015). An Industrial 
Control System Environment (ICSE) refers to a domain where industrial control operations and processes are performed. 
The basic functions of an ICS involve: sensor measurements, hardware control for actuators (breakers, switches, 
monitors), human-machine interfacing, and remote diagnostics and maintenance utilities (Amin and Sastry, 2015)  
(Nicholson et al., 2012). The modern ICS and it’s development trends enable great business and operational profitability, 
an inevitable array of security susceptibilities are as well introduced, which threaten the functional reliability of operations 
in the industrial domain (Abe et al., 2016). Over the last years, records continue to show an alarming increase in cyber 
threats and attacks against ICSs globally. 
 
The attack landscape against ICSEs have strikingly widened with remarkable dynamic patterns of attack vectors (Luallen, 
2014; Brassso, 2016; Harp and Gregory-Brown, 2016; Paganini, 2016).  Industrial cyber security, SCADA security, etc, 
are now buzz words for common topics of conversations amongst everyday industrial technology users (Evans et al., 
2016), and have become necessities towards normal operations in the industrial domain. Technically, security in IT is 
fairly standardised and differs from how it applies to ICS. The differences between the two chiefly border on operational  
requirements and prioritisation (Macaulay and Singer, 2012). Unlike the IT, most ICS security compromises have 
associated physical consequences and impacts. These are often more severe and abrupt than in the IT domain. Security 
issues in the ICS environment often appear in the form of habitual maintenance failures and other process anomalies, 
which make difficult the diagnosis and resolution of the issues. The main reasons for the difficulty of managing the 
security of ICSE include: vastly dispersed assets with frequent compulsory remote access requirements, traditional IT 
security applications such as antiviruses and firewalls may not be suitable for compatibility issues, and when possible, 
application could affect system availability which is not acceptable for ICS as a high-availability system. Older ICS 
systems are often not open to patching or upgrades. (Macaulay and Singer, 2012; Drias, Serhrouchni and Vogel, 2015).  
Cyber security threats to ICS encompass threat vectors like non-typical network protocols and instruction sets that cannot 
be blocked for operations, performance, and safety reasons (e.g. event and alarm traffics). More contextually, technical 
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security control may well be easily subverted by intelligent adversaries who can easily deceive unaware, unskilled, and 
unsuspecting ICS operators and users into undertaking actions and activities that can grant the attackers easy access and 
high privilege capacities to execute their malicious intents. These are often also undetectable by security alert systems 
until serious damages and anomalies begin to emerge (Johansson, Sommestad and Ekstedt, 2009; Fan et al., 2015). 
As cyber-attacks exacerbate, organisations have become concerned about how to react to security trends that threaten 
their business and operational relevance within the current highly-competitive business environment. Many recorded 
industrial cyber breaches have effectively beaten technological security solutions through exploiting human-factor 
limitations in knowledge and skills. These attack patterns have manipulated human elements into unintentionally 
conveying access to critical industrial assets. Cyber security has indeed become a necessary objective to achieve 
uninterrupted industrial functions in a changing operational technology environment. One way of defining cyber security 
is ‘the harmonisation of capabilities in people, processes, and(or) technologies; to secure and control both authorised 
and/or unlawful access, disruption, destruction, or modification of electronic computing systems (hardware, software, and 
networks), the data and information they hold’ (Ani, He and Tiwari, 2016). However, most current security solutions are 
technology-inclined.  People and process security contexts and requirements are often not considered (Ramakrishnan and 
Testani, 2011), often resulting in lopsided security that are malignantly exploited by malicious intelligent actors.  
An ICS is a system of industrial technologies and infrastructures built and(or) operated by people (workforce) for the 
execution of processes towards attaining target products or services. It implies that securing technology (hardware and/or 
software) alone resolves only a fraction of the larger security problem. A technology is often as weak and vulnerable as 
the people (workforce) that develop and(or) operate it, and the process(es) designed and structured to use it. For example, 
suppose Alice is a process engineer that operates an engineering workstation asset of an ICS, and employs technology 
‘A’ firewall and technology ‘B’ Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to protect her workstation from security compromise. 
Assuming Alice is unaware and unable to recognise various forms and signatures of social engineering attack schemes. 
Bob as an intelligent and predetermined attacker employs a deceptive spear-phishing means unknown to Alice and 
deceives her into clicking or running links or attachments on her workstation that literally enables a backdoor (entry point) 
into Alice’s system and network via a direct remote access. This happens seamlessly despite the presence and 
functionalities of techs ‘A’ and ‘B’ security features. Alice’s security ignorance, her uninformed and unskilled state in 
relations to evolving ICSE security trends such as confronted her, and her consequent actions or inactions undervalues 
techs ‘A’ and ‘B’; opening the door to an enemy attacker Bob.  
The above theoretical scenario highlights the importance of human-factors in ICSE cyber security assurance, especially 
emphasising the significance of security knowledge (awareness) and practical skills. Human-factor is as important as 
technical factors in ICSE security.  Real scenarios also consolidate this viewpoint. Probably, the agents of the 2013 
Stuxnet attack had the challenge of penetrating the Iranian Nuclear Power plant network since the network was air-gapped 
from external networks. Thus, the attackers used infected USB drive parking lot attack technique on a third party 
maintenance organisation, and relied upon human actors connecting the infected devices to their industrial  network and 
provide means for reaching and delivering Stuxnet to the nuclear plant network (Murphy, 2015). Earlier works on the 
concept of  security competence (capability) by Workman et al (2008), which investigated the “knowing-doing” gap in 
individuals showed that such individuals can have appropriate security skills and knowledge yet not apply these skills in 
consistent manner. Also, based on the analysed results of 588 workforce members of a technology service company, 
Workman et al (2008) concludes with the recommendation that security technology should be user-centred to avoid 
assessment tensions that can affect responses. 
Probable motivations for these attacks may have stemmed from the perception that: (i) most ICSE workforce (personnel) 
are often unfamiliar with advanced digital (cyber) security concepts, and (ii) Information Technology security workforce 
are often unfamiliar with ICSE operational concepts, and (iii) intelligent attackers now consider human actors (workforce) 
within the industrial environment as weak attractive exploit targets into operational system and networks (Howarth, 2014). 
The bid improve security in the ICSE through plugging the holes enumerated above provides motivation for engaging 
this research direction. Updated security awareness and training can increase security capabilities, thus, presents a viable 
solution to this issue. However, engaging proper security capabilities hinges on an adequate understanding of recurrent 
security capacities of the workforce, and a clear outline of areas of weaknesses and strengths. Effectively improving 
security capacities of a workforce will typically require building strengths in the identified weak areas.  
This work builds up on an earlier work on evaluating an industrial environment’s security capability based on the 
quantification of inherent cybersecurity knowledge and skills of the human workforce. Improvements are introduced I 
the aspect of computationally evaluating and inferring security incapability (vulnerability/susceptibility level) of human-
agents from their evaluated capability. This simplifies the process of characterising weak links amongst the workforce 
members involved. Thus, this study highlights the importance of evaluating workforce security capacities, identifying the 
weakest security capability member in the workforce (weakest link), and the culminated significance of this approach 
towards overall security assurance.  Understanding the measure of cybersecurity knowledge and skill capacities of the 
industrial workforce, and keeping abreast with the newest activities and trends in the cyber threat landscape can support 
the identification of attacks before they happen. As new threats continue to emerge,  learning the capability postures of 
the workforce,  determining  specific gaps, and plugging into the gaps with the right intelligence, all add-up a potential to 
minimize damages if a security breach occurs  (Mandiant, 2017). In an ICSE, human elements are critical assets and 
should form a line of defence against security threats. Effectively consolidating security and defence capacities of these 
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elements can be most effective following an understanding of the current security capability and vulnerability levels. This 
will support informed control applications.  
 
This work aims to provide a human-centred security capability and vulnerability evaluation method which can be used to 
evaluate the security aptitude of human agents within ICSE. This evaluation approach complements traditional technical 
capability and vulnerability analysis, thus enables a wider view of vulnerability assessment of an industrial environment 
where both technology and human agents are involved. More specifically, it explores how to understand and attribute 
quantitative ratings to security aptitudes of human agents in ICSE, and use such information to drive a robust industrial 
cyber security responsiveness and resilience. The approach and measures can be useful to security auditors, analysts, 
managers and industrial system owners in carrying out human-level threats and vulnerabilities assessments, identify most 
vulnerable human agents, as well as the areas where security is low. Responding to these, can significant influence 
improvement of overall organisational security. The contribution of this article includes; providing a novel approach for 
characterising and quantifying human-factor security capabilities based on security knowledge and security skills. It also 
supports the identification of potential security weakest links amongst an evaluated industrial workforce (human agents). 
It involves concept description and capability evaluations was associated with defined security standards, guidelines, and 
baseline requirements. The methodology then prescribed control interventions that are based on discovered weak links 
and weak security areas. 
 
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 discusses human-factor security issues and requirements, and 
statistical justifications for the need of human-factored approach to ICS security. Section 3 presents a review of related 
works in capability evaluations relating to contexts, methods, and tools. Sections 4 presents an overview of the proposed 
workforce capability evaluation model. Section 5 discusses the validation scenario adopted, the corresponding outcome 
and discussions. Sections 6 presents the conclusion and future work in the research. 
 
2  Human-Related Security Issues and Requirements 
As cyber-attacks continue to evolve, businesses and organisations have not ceased to express and react to security 
concerns that threaten their business and operational relevance within the currently highly-competitive business domain  
(Ralston, Graham and Hieb, 2007; Mirashe and Kalyankar, 2010). Many organisations keep updating technologies 
equipped with defensive capacities to protect automation processes from cyber intrusions or breaches. Notwithstanding, 
cyber-attacks and incidents against industrial control environments have continued to rise for couple of reasons. The most 
important is the reality of a drastic change in targeted vectors of attacks (Knowles et al., 2015). While organisations 
continue to invest heavily on technology security, attackers have strategically side-tracked attack concentration from 
technology to people (human) assets (IRM, 2015), since humans (users) typically need to interact with technologies to 
initiate, implement, and/or manage industrial processes. Somehow, recorded events clearly demonstrate that the analytical 
proficiencies of the human constituents through the exploitation of cognitive capacities are still  crucial for effective 
security in ICS environment (Chen et al., 2012; Gonzalez et al., 2014; Ben-Asher and Gonzalez, 2015). This is enabled 
by the existence and expression of easily exploited human weakness in the system process interaction loop. For instance,  
the analysis of the 2013 data breach against Target Corporation showed that Target’s security technology was  capable of 
detecting the breach, but the people (leaders and general employees) who should have been able to take appropriate 
responses to control the attack impacts, lacked the necessary skills and knowledge (Hershberger, 2014). The attack caused 
a disaster that cost Target about $148 million, and other financial institutions about $200 million  (Tobias, 2014). If Target 
had proactively evaluated the cybersecurity capability of its workforce and understood the potential knowledge and skills 
strengths and weaknesses much earlier, such episteme would have spurred the corporation to improve security capability 
of their workforce in relations to cyber-security awareness, self-protection, organisational preservation, and a security 
conscious and cultured attitude, and cyber incident response.  
 
Weak cybersecurity knowledge and skills in the workforce and leadership have become apparent to top the list of several 
human vulnerabilities in the minds of corporate decision makers, governments, and academic researchers (Adams and 
Makramalla, 2015). These have been quite dominant in the list of successful attack drivers in the industry. A study 
indicates that 20% of frightful security breaches in 2015 were attributed to decisive misuse of infrastructure assets, and 
31% due to human errors (IRM, 2015). Stolen credentials through phishing   accounts for 80% of data breaches (Debo, 
2015). Spear Phishing attacks have also topped security concerns for enterprises, accounting for an average loss of $1.6 
million,  impacting loss of employee productivity (43%), financial losses (32%), damage to company reputation (29%), 
damage to brand reputation (27%), and loss of intellectual property (25%) (CLOUDMARK, 2016). Such precarious 
situations continue to press on industries and organisations due to a lack of inadequate understanding of the security 
capacities of operational workforce, and failure to provide operational staff (humans) with effective and up-to-date 
cybersecurity knowledge and skills capability to defend against cyber-attacks (Ashford, 2016). 
 
These records suggest that despite any huge investments in technology security solutions to safeguard ICSs, human-
factored security characteristics still play very significant roles towards achieving a holistic cyber security posture and 
assurance. These records and their implications to overall security within the ICS environment clearly support the 
motivation to explore potential solutions. Knowledge and skills security characteristics are particularly important. The 
statistics further suggest that the value of an organisation’s chief security asset is more in its people – human constituents 
(workforce), than in technologies or laws and regulations (Navarro, 2007), and also points to humans as being potentially 
the weakest links    (Kaspersky-Labs, 2015) in the ICS operation chain. The success of any security venture is eventually 
dependent upon the human element – people are both the most significant resource and potentially the major threats to 
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security (PA Consulting Group, 2015). Eventually, a system or an organisation is as weak as its weakest link asset 
(Russell, 2002; Navarro, 2007).  In the ICS environment, these weak links are characterised by industrial control system 
personnel, such as operators, technicians, experts, and enterprise/corporate users, whose population  often outnumber the 
population in a security and non-security-oriented classification of the workforce (Robert, 2015). These people are 
typically unfamiliar with digital security concepts, and less keen about the importance of cybersecurity trends and 
practices, but more on operational performance trends (PA Consulting Group, 2015). This often puts greater 
demand/responsibility for assuring security on a relatively fewer numbered cybersecurity professionals, compounding 
their workload. The volumes, variety, and target multi-directivity of attacks patterns also down-plays the capability of 
cybersecurity professionals to directly and completely exert control on all forms of attacks that target the industrial 
environment. Besides, the non- security-savvy ICS workforce seem to be predominantly targeted than the security experts. 
The former often lack adequate skill capacity for effective response, and sometimes lack updated knowledge as well. 
Thus, cybersecurity knowledge and practical security response skills are two key attributes of workforce security 
capability, considered invaluable for achieving a secure industrial operating environment. However, the effective input 
of security knowledge and skills should be built on; a clear understanding of existing measures of capability, and the 
identification of capability shortfalls that reveal user vulnerabilities (weaknesses) to cyber attackers. This can only be 
achieved through evaluations. 
 
A human-involved approach is required to supplement existing technical-based security approaches towards an overall 
cyber security assurance. Badie and Lashkari (2012)   categorised the factors that affect the security of computing systems 
into two: (i) human factor and, (ii) organization factor. According to the researchers, earlier works indicated that of these 
two categories, the human factor seemed the most important. A human-factored security endeavour is required that can 
improve the capabilities of the operational technology human constituents, so that they can appropriately recognise and 
respond to cyber intrusion events within the ICS environment. Quantitative analysis could provide an easy approach to 
evaluating the security capability of a user in relations to cyber-attacks, as it can help both senior managers and general 
infrastructure users to intuitively understand the status of their cybersecurity capability. Quantitative approach also 
simplifies result presentation and interpretations. Quantitative approaches allow for consistent results, the production of 
trend interpolations and forecasts, quicker situational understanding for decision-making, and the further representation 
of results in better understood formats like charts, graphs, and tables for time-critical decision-making.  These are 
necessary to improve security posture and assurance within the industrial operating environment, without which top 
management is unable to retain high degrees of confidence about the security of their industrial asset (Evans et al., 2016). 
3. Related Works 
The assessment of cyber security capability of human agents (workforce) is quite helpful towards achieving an efficient 
workforce security consciousness (Navarro, 2007). There are few researches which explored this area to propose schemes 
for assessing cybersecurity postures from the workforce perspectives.   
A Human Factor Vulnerability Analysis (HFVA) framework is presented by Kraemer & Carayon (Kraemer and Carayon, 
2003). The framework presents a three-stage process (identification, analysis, and solution) for determining human-factor 
vulnerabilities connected to technical vulnerabilities. The framework is presented as a process that follows a 
system/network-wide technical audit conducted after the discovery of technical vulnerabilities that bear human-factor 
underpinning.  The HFVA model is limited in that it depends on the existence of technical vulnerabilities, and evaluates 
how well human network administrative experts are able to classify and appropriate respond to technical security 
vulnerabilities. Thus, it assumes human-factor vulnerabilities to be solely dependent on technical vulnerabilities. This is 
not entirely true with changing attack patterns, where social engineering attacks forms are employed to exploit and 
compromise systems and networks even when clear technical vulnerabilities have not been identified. The human agent 
itself is an asset that can have exploitable vulnerabilities, and can be independent of any technical vulnerabilities. 
Human agents with varied levels of knowledge and experience in cyber security can demonstrate different perceptions of 
cyber security. Typically, higher security proficiencies imply better capability as experience can influence decision-
making capability levels (Asgharpour, Liu and Camp, 2007). Advanced knowledge and previous experience could 
enhance the sensitivity to security threats and the performance of incident response.  The researchers in (Goodall, Lutters 
and Komlodi, 2009) highlighted that domain knowledge in information and network security, as well as situated 
environmental knowledge grounded in an analyst’s unique environment; are required to boost the expertise for effective 
intrusion detection by an analyst. The domain knowledge includes: theoretical knowledge acquired through formal 
education, training, or certification (Chi, 2006), and practical knowledge cultured through hands-on practice and 
experience with tools,  methods of operation, and work- flows. The situated environmental knowledge is acquired through 
continued interactions with a specific operating environment (Goodall, Lutters and Komlodi, 2004). Researchers have 
used interviews and questionnaires to drive easy understanding of both mental models and security workforce workflows  
(D’Amico and Whitley, 2008; Paul and Whitley, 2013).  
 
Wang (2013) explored an assessment of cyber security knowledge and behaviour using an anti-phishing scenario. The 
study investigated the relationship between evaluated users’ knowledge of cyber security risks and solutions (in relations 
to phishing), and their attitude and intention towards adopting and using cyber security solution. The outcome showed a 
positive correlation which implied that the extent of security knowledge influenced the attitude and intention towards 
adopting cybersecurity solutions. Another significant finding indicated a positive correlation between direct assessment 
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answers and self-assessment responses. Wang (2013) also recommended security training and assessment tools surveys 
and questionnaires. 
 
The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (CCMM) (Christopher et al., 2014) describes an assessment framework, 
consisting of a set of characteristics, indicators or patterns that embody capability and progression which can be 
contextualised to various disciplines.  CCMM provides a flexible guide to help organisations establish and enhance their 
security capability using corporate-level abstractions. More common studies focus on the impacts of human perception 
(Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu and Benbasat, 2010; Siponen, Adam Mahmood and Pahnila, 2014), attitudes, and behaviour 
(Parsons et al., 2014; Evans et al., 2016) to organisational security capacities, and policy implementations. These works 
have emphasised the relevance of social human attributes to effective security outcomes and performances.  While these 
attributes are quite relevant and influential in deriving security conclusions in terms of capacities and controls, security 
knowledge and skill levels of individuals can influence the outcome of each attribute.  Thus, it is rational to consider the 
primary influencing factors and how they impact resulting security capacities and controls. 
 
Beautement et al (2016) argued that effective security management required that security managers were able to evaluate 
the effectiveness of prescribed policies, as well as the impact of employee behaviour. They proposed a Productive Security 
(ProdSec) methodology for aggregating huge datasets on employee behaviour and attitudes using scenario-based surveys. 
The approach was designed to ensure repeatable and scalable data collection, from which better insights can be deduced 
about security-related issues facing employees, their response behaviours, and attitudes. Results indicated that that 
business area, age, and geographical location, all provide axis of differentiating response maturity levels of employees, 
as well as intra-population group of employees. Details as these can influence efficient planning of future trainings, 
communications, and policy-making. It can also support proactive targeted interventions (remediation) on specific 
employees, which can save from inclusions in non-targeted interventions and reduce the expense on employee compliance 
budgets (Beautement, Sasse and Wonham, 2009).  
 
Ben-Asher and Gonzalez (2015) investigated the security capacity differences between security experts and novices 
within an organisational setup. The study evaluated the expertise of cyber security analysts with specific application to 
intrusion detection, and the use of intrusion detection systems (IDS). Using emulated scenarios, the researchers used the 
IDS response approach to evaluate the general performance of both expert and novice security analysts outside 
conventional operational environments. The outcome showed that experts performed slightly than novices. Results also 
suggested that theoretical knowledge as being completely independent of practical knowledge. The dissociation was more 
noticeable in the expert analysts’ group than in the novice group.  
 
Generally, the use of quantitative tools and measures of performance relating to intrusion detection scenarios provided an 
effective means of evaluating and characterising security control capacities of the expert groups as desired (Ben-Asher 
and Gonzalez, 2015). Quantitative analysis could provide an easy approach to evaluating the security capability of a user 
in relations to cyber-attacks, as it can help both senior managers and general infrastructure users to intuitively understand 
the status of their cyber security capability. A quantitative approach also simplifies result presentation and interpretations. 
Quantitative approaches allow for consistent results, the production of trend interpolations and forecasts, quicker 
situational understanding for decision-making, and the further representation of results in better understood in formats 
like charts, graphs, and tables for time-critical decision-making.  These are necessary to improve security capacity and 
assurance within the industrial operating environment, and without which top management is unable to retain high degrees 
of confidence about the security of their industrial asset (Evans et al., 2016). This work provides the baseline for our 
research and contribution. 
 
Some clear points picked from the above reviews include security capabilities can be evaluated through interviews 
(structured and semi-structured) (D’Amico et al., 2005), questionnaires (Botta et al., 2007), observations and 
gamifications (Paul and Whitley, 2013; Adams and Makramalla, 2015; Ben-Asher and Gonzalez, 2015),  penetrations 
testing (Aloul, 2012),  etc. While a body of works exists around understanding the security posture of organisations, there 
is little research that has proffered a clear quantitative scheme for evaluating and attributing security capacities to 
individuals within an organisation, and use such individual aggregations to derive overall organisational security 
capability. The CCMM scheme focuses on organisation-wide dispositions rather than workforce-focused dispositions. 
 
Cyber security knowledge and practical security response skills are two direct attributes of workforce security capability 
which are invaluable towards achieving a secure industrial operating environment. These can be quite distinct as well. 
However, the effective input of security knowledge and skills should be built on; a clear understanding of existing 
measures of capability, and the identification of capability shortfalls that reveal user vulnerabilities (weaknesses) to cyber 
attackers. This can be achieved through evaluations. Existing researches on security performance evaluation of human 
agents within organisations typically focused on comparative analysis of security perceptions, with emphasis the security 
staff (analysts) who had the duty of securing a system. There is no research on other operational human agents such as 
found in the ICS domain and their performance and contribution to overall system security. We have not yet seen research 
in identifying potential workforce’s weakest links, potential weak security capability areas, and the discrete but 
informative adoption of security measures. This work will fill the gaps.  
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4.  Proposed Evaluation Model 
The lack of familiarity with digital security concepts observed in ICS workforce opens a great deal of security 
vulnerabilities that could be easily exploited through social engineering by intelligent intruders. These adversaries exploit 
human characteristics and attitudes, such as ignorance, desire for gain, rewards, being helpful and responsible to coax 
actions, and (or) inactions from targeted workforce, to enable non-resistant access to systems and infrastructures, which 
could otherwise yield resistance when and if accessed directly. The number and capability of organisation-resident 
cybersecurity professionals, who have responsibility for system security in an enterprise is typically inadequate to 
completely protect the organisation. Every single ICS OT personnel presents an equal access point to the ICS, and the 
defence capacity of each ICS personnel contributes to an overall security status.  
 
4.1  Security Capability  
In this study, workforce security capability is considered as the combined, normalised, and (or) harmonised expression 
of security proficiencies in knowledge (domain and situational) and practical skills of a human agent (user) for appropriate 
actions, reactions, and (or) inactions for effective security of operational systems. Thus, industrial workforce security 
capability is modelled in terms of their knowledge and skill levels. These two attributes are considered as dominant factors 
in the security proficiency of operators in the ICS environment. Security knowledge level is defined as the measure of 
theoretical information that an individual has about cyber threats, vulnerabilities, attack patterns and impacts on a host 
system. Skill level outlines the ability to use accrued hands-on techniques and(or) tools to detect or recognise cyber-attack 
attempts, patterns and techniques, and to respond timely with appropriate countermeasures. Knowledge and skills in 
digital security concepts, evolving threats, vulnerabilities, attack intelligence, and the practical security response skills of 
each ICS personnel, allow a better understanding of the inherent security level of the entire workforce in an industry 
enterprise. This will help create the essential threshold of organisational security. 
 
ICS workforce typically include IT security experts, IT operations personnel, and OT personnel (field operators, 
automation engineers, SCADA and telemetry engineers, corporate management, etc). All of them contribute directly and 
(or) indirectly, actively or passively in control system process activities, and their individual security capabilities 
contribute directly and indirectly to the threshold of general workforce security capacity. The threshold of general 
workforce security capability refers to the harmonised security status-derivative in relations to all evaluated workforce 
security capabilities in the organisation. Thus, the commitment of workforce to protecting an organisation and operational 
infrastructure is a critical factor of a strong cybersecurity defence. The approach of appraising and enhancing workforce 
cybersecurity capabilities as a means of emphasising a positive security culture is necessary.  As knowledge levels indicate 
the degree of awareness to potential cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities, attacks patterns, and damaging impacts, the 
evaluation of knowledge seeks to verify if, and how much an individual is acquainted with prevailing ICS security trends 
and intelligence in a specific working environment. It is an attempt to ascertain (and to what degree) if the industrial 
workforce knows what to do, and (or) what not to do to guard against successful breaches from cyber-attacks.  
 
In contrast, skill levels can help build the ICS personnel some degree of practical social and technical strengths for hands-
on, efficient and appropriate actions and reactions to potential security attacks, such that industry workforce is able to 
prevent cyber-attacks or mitigate attack impacts. Thus, cybersecurity capability evaluation should encompass information 
gathering in all aspects of security relating to ICS safety, availability, integrity, confidentiality, and accountability. 
Assessment scopes should cover typical areas such as personnel security responsibilities, prevalent attack patterns, 
signatures, and appropriate response modes, adherence to adopted security policies, standards, and best practice solutions, 
samples of ICS security failures and impacts, updated security threat and vulnerability intelligence, and 
observed/discovered capability gaps in individual personnel, security initiative, and adherence to global standards 
(Parsons et al., 2010; PA Consulting Group, 2015). 
 
4.2 The Weakest Link  
The statistics enumerating the successes of cyber incidents influenced by the ability of attackers to easily con  human 
actors to behave or respond inappropriate to attack and compromise scenarios within their work domains add to the 
evidence that suggests that human actors are potentially the weakest links (Ashford, 2016). Clearly, all other things being 
equal including well instituted technical security measures, the record of cyber incidents described in section 2 also 
demonstrate facts that intelligent attackers motivated by potential financial gains tend to direct their malicious effort 
toward less-protected targets  (Pan, Zhong and Mei, 2015). The attackers aim to compromise potential targets (human 
actors) with poor or weak abilities to defend infrastructure and information systems from attacks. “The weakest link” 
refers to the most poorly protected asset. “The weakest link” asset has become a key factor to determine the security level 
of the chain. If these corporations want to improve the security level of the whole information systems and optimize 
security chain integration, they must improve the security level of “the weakest link” (Pan, Zhong and Mei, 2015) . The 
question left to be answered remains; how to find the weakest link? 
 
An attempt to address this is demonstrated in a previous work (Ani, He and Tiwari, 2016) from a human-factor security 
perspective. An approach is proffered for identifying the weakest link in security capability of ICS human workforce. 
‘Humans’, also referred to as ‘workforce’, often present the weakest link in an operational security chain (Mitnick and 
Simon, 2003), and  an organisation security capacity is as weak as its weakest link. Understanding workforces’ security 
capabilities inferred from knowledge and skill measures, deriving a workforce-focused organisational security posture, 
and the identification of specific most vulnerable workforce constituents (weakest link) in the system are important for 
evaluating an overall ICS security posture (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu and Benbasat, 2010; Aloul, 2012; Pan, Zhong and Mei, 
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2015). A weakest link refers to the personnel with least knowledge and practical proficiency in security for the 
implementation of ICS security objectives. Essentially, the weakest link is the least security-capable individuals in the 
operational domain, who demonstrate the highest likelihood of becoming victims of cybersecurity attacks (Aloul, 2012; 
Vishwanath, 2016). Such human elements represent the easiest attack vectors, and provide the weakest penetrable entry 
point to a system irrespective of whatever other safeguards in place. Identifying these weakest points through evaluation 
presents an essential line of action towards security assurance. Identifying and strengthening weakest links is equivalent 
to raising the bar of security capability of an organisational workforce. This work explores further this concept of human 
security capability evaluation (Ani, He and Tiwari, 2016), and proposes a quantitative approach to characterising 
workforce security capability, and identifying potential weak-links in an ICS operational domain. It also explores how 
the security weaknesses of the workforce members can influence the implementation of a priority-driven control strategy.  
 
4.3  The Model 
As an extension of prior work on human  cybersecurity capability evaluation (Ani, He and Tiwari, 2016) where 
organisational security level is derived from the combined average for knowledge and skills security capacity for all 
human actors within an evaluation context. Further research has proffered more clarity and rational against initial 
assumptions that capabilities in individuals are interdependent such that average values can be used to represents a 
harmonised overall security capacity. It is more rationale to view each user as independent and a potential entry point into 
the system irrespective of the presence of others. Thus, an improvement in the weakest link attribute is introduced to the 
capability evaluation process where harmonised security capability ratings implicitly express measures of weakness or 
susceptibility to attacks. The collection of varied values in a set of capability ratings is indicative of the varied, 
independent susceptibilities or weak points that can allow successful cyber-attacks. The multiplicity of capability values 
indicates the variety of potential attack surfaces, and implies the multiplicity of corresponding human vulnerability weak-
points for possible initiation and (or) accomplishment of cyber-attacks. In a set of capability rating scores, higher values 
suggest higher defensive surfaces and lesser vulnerable surfaces in relations to a defined security baseline, and vice versa.  
 
The concept of security defence combined with vulnerability baselines, and the quantitative representation could support 
easy and clear identification, articulation, and attribution of potential weak-links. The least capability value together with 
its corresponding vulnerability rating suggests the most vulnerable surface, and points to an associated human actor (user) 
with the greatest likelihood of successfully falling for a human-factor cyber-attack event. Hence, represents the weakest 
link. The new evaluation scheme presents a five-stage activity process of evaluating workforce cybersecurity capability, 
which include: definition, data collection, formulation, representation, and attribution as presented in Figure 1. Each 
stage provides a list of sub-stages, which form an overall security capability evaluation of ICS workforce. 
 
4.3.1 Definition 
This involves the definition of knowledge and skills security capability requirements, and the outline of desirable security 
capability baselines.  
 
A.! Security requirements 
Workforce security evaluation should be built upon defined security policies and requirements, compliant with relevant 
standards and best practices, and contextual objectives of the specific operational environment. There exist several 
standards focusing on security in the ICSE, most of which are domain-specific, and do not cover all ICS types, security 
functionalities and requirements. For instance, the UK ‘10 Steps to Cyber Security’ guideline (UK-Cabinet-Office, 2012), 
NIST SP 800-53 Revision 4 - guidance on security and privacy controls for systems and organisations (NIST, 2013), 
NIST SP 800-82 Revision 2 - guide on industrial control system security, etc., all have sections that advise on 
requirements and guidelines regarding personnel security awareness and training. Combining recommendations from 
these standards can provide a better reference for situational security requirements to guide capability evaluations 
considering the specific features of the system/environment under consideration. 
 
 
B.! Security Baseline  
Security baseline defines desirable the status of the metrics/measures, representing varied capabilities and their 
corresponding attribute ratings from security requirements. It can be considered as the point of ideal capabilities of all 
workforce members. Any status lower than this ideal capability is considered a non-ideal capability.  
 
In the proposed model, a capability ratio is introduced with value range of [0, 1]. We adopt the FIPS 199 (NIST, 2004) 
security categorisation recommendations to define three levels of capabilities: low, moderate, and high levels. For this, a 
three-group ratio is defined where a one-step incremental ratio is used to derive respective upper bounds: 1/3, 2/3, and 
3/3 for the three levels (low, moderate, and high) within the defined range 0-1 as earlier prescribed. The capability ranges 
for the three groups/levels of classification are presented in Table 1. This capability ratio is used to provide capability 
categorisations for which the workforce and their associated capability evaluation values that would be classified. This 
way, human agent security capacities are grouped according to closely related scores/ratings to indicate the personnel that 
share similar of very close capability traits and proficiencies, and to support better decision-making on appropriate 
responses.  
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Figure 1: Human Workforce Security Capability Evaluation Scheme 
 
This is not adopted as a closed scheme, but rather, it represents a way of achieving categorisations for security capabilities.  
Following a similar approach, other grouping schemes may be adopted with a t-level categorisation, where t can be 2, 3, 
4, or 5, and defining the number of capability categorisation desired from an evaluation scheme. Depending on the value 
of t, the number of PSC, ratio, fractional limits, capability range, and priority ratings would be proportionate to t, and will 
corresponding number of classifications to represent dispersed or closely-related security capacities of human agents 
under evaluation. For instance, if t=5, it means 5-level classification is used.  Upper bounds for the classes include; 1/5, 
2/5, 3/5, 4/5, and 5/5, which is still between 0 and 1. The values for capability variables (knowledge and skills) will then 
be spread among the 5 groups. In comparison with t=3, using t=5 will imply that workforce capabilities are classed into 
5 groups instead of 3. The 3 groups will break off to form independent groups to make up the 5 groups. The implication 
is that the specific capability value for each workforce would remain unchanged since the same range [0,1] is used, and 
the evaluation tool (questionnaire) characteristics (questions, multichoice answers and score allocations) also remain 
unchanged. Only the values’ classification in capability range and priority ranking may change. The capability ratings are 
applied to knowledge, skills, and harmonised capability metrics accordingly, and the range is used for ranking the level 
of workforce capabilities.  A priority order for security response/control is defined which is the reverse order of the 
security capability levels for security arrangement.  
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Situational Security 
Requirement
(2)  DATA    
       COLLECTION
Methods & Tool:
- (Questionnaire)
(4)  REPRESENTATION
Capability Placement Chart 
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Capability Priority Table
Statistics Measures 
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Contextual Interpretation
(5)  ATTRIBUTION
Weakest  Link 
Remediation
Characterise
Input
Compare
Review
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Security Baseline 
Security Knowledge
Security Skills
Harmonised Capability Input
(3)  FORMULATION
S_Knowledge Measure 
(Individual)
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(Individual)
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(Knowledge and Skills)
Harmonised Capability 
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Output
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Table 1: Capability - Priority Range Table 
Capability Rating Capability Range 
Priority Rating 
(Security Response) 
Low (l) 0 ≤ l ≤  
!∀ High 
Moderate (m) 
!∀ ˂ m ≤   #∀ Moderate 
High (h) 
#∀ ˂ h ≤ 1 Low 
 
4.3.2 Data Collection Methods and Tools 
To determine the status of an entity in the light of prescribed security requirements, it is necessary to extract the 
information of the entity. It is pertinent for the workforce security capacity evaluation to aggregate the data of the response 
or reactions of ICSE workforce members to cyber threats, attacks and/or incidents through active and/or passive, direct 
and/or indirect security capability investigation. The investigation should reflect prescribed ICSE security policy 
guidelines, objectives, evaluation timeline, a targeted workforce size, and quality of expected feedback. 
 
For this evaluation, the test-based questionnaire tool is used for data collection following similar approaches observed in 
related literatures. This approach is typically used to determine if a tested subject qualifies in relations to certain prescribed 
standards as in this case; the UK Cyber Security Essentials (10 Steps to Cyber Security). Feedback data are collected and 
characterised to clearly represent attributes of individuals in the evaluated group. Score ratings are attributed based on the 
coded response/feedbacks in relations to the organisation’s view of the security risk implications of each response to the 
security objectives. These quantitative feedback data then serve as inputs to the computation stage of the evaluation 
model. 
4.3.3 Formulation  
At this stage, mathematical procedures are applied on collected data to determine possible workforce capability values. 
Following the description of workforce security capability as a function of security knowledge and skills of a workforce, 
two groups of data corresponding to security knowledge and skills evaluations are derived. 
 
Assuming p is an element in set P of ICS workforce personnel, whose security capacity will be evaluated, and N implies 
the total number of members in the set. Depending on the evaluation technique, let K = {k1, k2,…, kN} represents the set 
of evaluation questions (from capability data collection tool which can be a survey) for knowledge capability. Every 
element in K contains a multi-choice list of evaluation (survey) response options each having a corresponding score 
allocation based on expert judgment on the implications of the choice to an overall assurance of security of the ICS. A 
response knowledge score allocation (x) range of 1 to 5 is proposed, 1 implying a lower potential and 5 implying a higher 
potential of resistance to the prescribed security scenario. Each response to an element in K therefore has a value range: 
{x| 1≤ x ≤5}. The variety of feedbacks in K will yield varied occurrence of x during the data aggregation. Hence, the 
cumulative knowledge capacity (CKC) for every p ∈ P, as the measure of the total quantitative knowledge capability (Kc) 
scores of a single workforce member. This is represented in equation 1. Note that equation 1 represents the computational 
model for deriving the security knowledge capability score of a single workforce (human agent) obtained from the score 
allocations associated to the individual’s responses in the evaluation tool. 
 
��∋ = ���∗ =	 ,−(�. �2)425! 6∋ , ∀	� ∈ �															(1) 
where nx is the number of occurrences of respective response allocation x (i.e., 1-5) 
 
Similarly, the cumulative skill capability (CSC) of � ∈ �	can also be derived from a set S of skills capability evaluation 
questions (from capability data collection tool which can be a survey), using similar scheme and range for skill score (y) 
as in knowledge score (x), i.e. 1-5. The total quantitative skill capability (Sc) rating of a single workforce member p can 
be denoted as equation 2. This represents the computational model for deriving the security skill capability score of a 
single workforce (human agent) also obtained from the score allocations associated to the individual’s responses in the 
evaluation tool. 
��∋ = ���∗ =	=−>�. �≅Α4≅5! Β∋ , ∀	� ∈ �															(2) 
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Equations 1 and 2 can be used to compute corresponding knowledge and skill capabilities of each workforce member p 
in the group P of the workforce under evaluation. The harmonisation of Kc and Sc values yields a personalised security 
capability (PSC) computed via a Geometric Mean (GM) technique of the knowledge and skills capability score associated 
with a single individual. This is presented as Equation 3.  GM offers the strength of being less submissive to the vast 
skewness influence of a very large values in a range of distribution (Manikandan, 2011), through normalising quantities 
to ensure that no singular quantity alone perpetually dominates the weighing of a final result. A set of PSCs will be 
generated, corresponding to all members, � ∈ �, and fed into the representation stage of the evaluation process. 
 ���∋ =	>��∋ 		× 		��∋Α! #Ε , ∀	� ∈ �																	(3) 
4.3.4 Representation 
The visualisation of workforce capacity should drive easy and better understanding of security perspectives, especially 
by top management and decision-makers who are often less technically savvy. To achieve this visualisation, Capability 
Placement Chart (CPC) and Capability Priority Table (CPT) are proposed as effective methods that can be used as shown 
in Figure 2 (a) and (b), respectively. 
 
The CPC embodies a scattered diagrammatic representation and placement of a set of derived PSC values. The values 
would typically be between the potential minimum and maximum capability ratings for the group of workforces, and 
which depict the status of security capacity for workforce members evaluated. High capability value would mean a high 
knowledge and skills potentials with respect to outlined security baseline. A range of priorities attributed to each PSC 
outline the magnitude of security attention and concern that should be attributed to each PSC value in line with the 
capability-priority rating range outlined in Table 1. The order of priority for security control effort is in the reverse order 
of security capacity. Workforce members with high PSC values retain a relatively high degree of security awareness and 
practical proficiencies, implying a higher likelihood to respond appropriately to potential security incidents, at least within 
the scope defined in the evaluation tool. PSC values that fall within the moderate capability ratings imply a moderate 
priority rating, and those within the low capability rating imply a high priority rating. These particularly indicate low level 
security awareness and (or) skills, and thus a higher need for security control measures that can improve their capacities 
to an acceptable level and within the prescription of the evaluation objectives.  
 
The CPT presents PSC values alongside corresponding Kc and Sc values; helping to provide a holistic detail and 
comparative provisioning for the evaluation process. It provides a means of easily identifying both initial and successive 
weakest links in an array of PSC values. In the case where further or deeper insights are required about each metric or the 
harmonised format, capability priority table also provides a means for the optional analysis of derive measures using 
conventional statistical paradigms, such as measures of central tendency and dispersion. It can also support a test of 
hypothesis where necessary to compare or consolidate on findings and conclusion from initial evaluation results. 
 
Figure 2: Capability Representation Formats 
 
The interpretation of result involves a contextualised mental clarification of the significance of the results in the 
representation stage. This tie real meanings and implications to derived quantities and measures in both knowledge and 
skills evaluations in relations to security threats, vulnerabilities, attacks capability gaps in the ICS workforce. Such 
interpretations simplify the understanding of the points of high risk, the scale of risks and potential impacts from 
workforce perspective. It contributes to an understanding of what is expected of workforce members towards an overall 
operations security of ICS. 
 
Workforce ID
P
S
C
High Priority
Moderate Priority
Low Priority
min
max
WF 
ID
Kc Sc PSC PR
(a): Capability Placement Chart (b): Capability Priority Table
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4.3.5 Attribution 
This involves the clear identification of the weakest link attribute to a relative workforce member or group in line with a 
prescribed attribute function. In the approach proposed, the weakest link attribute implies the workforce or group with 
the least possible capability rating value and highest possible priority rating value in the capability priority table (CPT). 
The focus is typically on the PSC array, however, depending on the targeted objective, Kc and Sc arrays can also be used 
to attribute weakest link. Assuming Z represent the set of PSC values in the CPT, the weakest link (WL) attribute can be 
determined with simple mathematical minimum function as; 
  �� = 	���(�)																(3) 
 
The characterisation of the weakest link also guides the process of determining the specific security vulnerabilities 
demonstrated by workforce members, and potential control solutions as a means of remediating identified capability gaps. 
The results and inferences from the evaluation process gives an understanding of the security incidence response and 
control measures that can be engaged. This typically tilts towards security capability areas where workforce members 
demonstrate a low degree of knowledge and skills. 
 
5  Scenario-Based Testing 
A scenario-based testing and validation technique is used to explore the usability and workability of the proposed 
approach.  
 
5.1  Evaluation Tool (Survey) Design 
 
An online questionnaire evaluation tool is adopted as a means towards achieving scalable collections of evaluation data. 
The reason for this validation was to assess the suitability of the proposed method for achieving efficient quantitative 
evaluations of ICSE workforce cybersecurity capability. To ascertain its effectiveness towards the identification of; 
potential weakest link(s), predominant security vulnerability areas, and relevant control measures. The defined security 
objectives for the assessment included: (i) evaluate the knowledge and skills security capability of the industrial workforce 
in relations to prescribed security guides, (ii) ascertain the weakest link from computed workforce personalised security 
capability values, and (iii) identify possible weak capability security themes and control areas in the workforce. 
 
The purpose for adopting an online questionnaire approach was to efficiently reach large numbers of industrial workforce 
respondents, while allowing for participation in the assessment from any geographical location. This way, the demand 
constraints for participation is reduced, and response rates likelihoods potentially increased. It was also meant to create 
more realistic unsupervised assessment scenarios that will yield realistic data collection. The assessment questionnaire 
was circulated via email links to forum members of the UK IoT Security Foundation. It was opened to those who shared 
concerns about human-factor security vulnerabilities, and desired a way of determining specific security capabilities of 
respective workforce member within their industrial organisations, to support security decision-making. The evaluation 
contents shared contained clear description of the security capability evaluation questionnaire and its purpose.  
 
In line with the model approach proposed, the evaluation was made following some recommended security control 
attributes and requirements for enabling cyber-attack defence, effective security within a digital system like ICS, as 
contained in NIST SP 800-82 v2 (Stouffer et al., 2015), and UK 10 steps to Cybersecurity (UK-Cabinet-Office, 2012) 
good practice guide. Specific areas considered include: privacy and access control, system/network security monitoring, 
user awareness and training, secure configurations, removable media protection, personnel/credential security, home and 
mobile security, email security, malware protection, incident response, updates and patch management.  
 
5.2  Capability Evaluation Tool (Survey) Testing and Refining  
Survey questions were designed to evaluate the level of respondents’ knowledge and skills in relations to the above-listed 
security themes. The broad security themes outlined in 5.1  also reflected similar  security focus areas enumerated by 
Parson et al (2014) that provide valid themes for evaluating human aspect of information security. Questions were 
designed in scenario-based formats to evaluate the level of respondents’ knowledge and skills in relations to these varied 
security theme. Initial assumptions included that the workforce members involved already had prior awareness and 
guidance on adherence to the prescribed security guides and essentials. The assessment was thus to ascertain the extent 
to which workforce members are holding up or improving on the security knowledge and skills already imparted by 
organisations. In structuring the questions, the design objectives were to: (i) present realistic and familiar security 
scenarios to participants, and (ii) proffer answer options that are realistic and familiar to the participants.  
 
The initial evaluation tool (survey) comprised of two sets of questions covering knowledge and skills respectively. Each 
set comprised of 30 questions (3 questions per security theme) and focused on direct evaluations of security capability 
via applying the proposed model. Each question had 5 multiple-choice answers. This initial survey tool was subjected to 
quality testing using one-to-one interviews with 3 cyber security professionals (2 IT security experts and 1 ICS security 
expert) not included in the general capability evaluation sample. The inputs from experts were used to evaluate the validity 
and reliability of the survey tool in relations to its representativeness of all the security themes adopted in 5.1. Each expert 
answered questions relating to: if the survey tool was measuring what is intended, i.e., workforce security knowledge and 
skills. If the questions captured all the security themes of interest? If there was a need to add or cut down on questions, 
and rank the 3 questions in each security theme according to relevance. Each expert was to revise (where necessary) and 
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provide ranking score allocations to the multiple-choice answers in each question based on the expert’s perceived severity 
or implication of each response to an overall cyber-attack susceptibility. 
 
In response to recommendations from the expert on the survey evaluations, significant and necessary improvements were 
achieved. The number of questions for each security theme was reduced to 2 for both the knowledge and skills sets. For 
each security theme, the top two most relevant questions identified by experts were selected. This reduced the number of 
questions in each set from 30 to 20. Following expert recommendations, a third set (comprising of 6 questions) was 
introduced to capture additional respondent demographic data (gender, age, work group, and possession of security 
certification) and a security self-evaluation rating. Score allocations for each of the multiple-choice answers were obtained 
by taking the average of the scores for each choice allocated by the experts. Where there were ties, further interaction was 
engaged with the experts to understand their viewpoints and use that to resolve score allocation ties amongst choice 
answers.  
 
Thus, the capability evaluation tool (survey) output of this testing yielded 3 sets of questions: set A for respondents’ 
demographics and self-evaluations (6 questions), set B for respondents’ security knowledge evaluations (20 questions), 
and set C for security skills evaluations (20 questions). Each question in sections B and C has 5 multiple-choice answers 
with respective score allocations, corresponding to the perceived severity or implication of each answer to an overall 
cyber-attack susceptibility and potential risk posed. The accompanying multi-choice answers is to represent varied 
security susceptibility levels (from high to low) for a respondent. The score allocation range is from 1 to 5, where an 
answer that implies a least security implication has a highest score of 5, while that with a highest implication has a least 
score of 1. A respondent’s (knowledge or skills) capability is inferred from the choice answer for every question by the 
respondent.  
 
The revised evaluation tool was pilot-tested with a team of six researchers at the manufacturing informatics centre in 
Cranfield University undertaking a research project for the development of a similar physical demonstrator of cyber 
security in manufacturing. The pilot test was built on the assumption: (i) the team represents a small-scale industrial 
(manufacturing) workforce, (ii) all the members of the team had equal action potentials to ensure the attainment of 
prescribed objectives of the project. The revised evaluation tool was administered to each team member and responses 
analysed using the workforce capability evaluation approach. The corresponding knowledge and skills capability ratings 
were derived using the appropriate evaluation functions as prescribed in the model. For this, the capability priority 
rankings include: 20.00 ≤ h ≤ 33.33 for high, 33.33 < m ≤ 66.67 for moderate, and 66.67 < l ≤ 100.00 for low. The low 
priority range of scores represented the ‘Ideal state’ I of the metric quantities. The evaluation yielded different levels of 
capabilities for knowledge, skills, and normalised capability ratings for the team members. The evaluation provided 
quantitative value reflections of the team members security capabilities, from which the weakest link can be identified. 
Based on the model description, the weakest link capability is attributed to the team member ID WF03 (Kc = 23, and Sc 
= 48) with a normalised capability rating CR = 33.23. A further look into the demographic profile of WF03: not having 
any form of security certification, product development process designer (not belonging to a security workgroup), and 
not having any form of work experience; all combine to suggest an element of true representation of the security state of 
the weakest link in comparison with others in the team. 
 
The revised survey tool was again passed through the experts for another testing for quality in terms of identifying poor 
question wording and ordering, as well as errors in rationale layout, multichoice answers and associated score allocations 
to improve the quality and credibility of response and results. With minimal alterations, the final evaluation tool was used 
for the actual evaluation with real external target audience. Security knowledge capability survey was captured through 
structured questions that query respondent’s awareness relative to their work environments and trends about certain 
threats, vulnerabilities, attacks or control details or features. For example, the question below is one of the knowledge 
capability questions that queries on ‘system/network monitoring’:  
 
‘The risk of your industrial process/operational environment becoming a victim of a cyber-attack has increased in the 
past year, and you are conscious of this while undertaking your routine duties in the workplace. To what extent do you 
agree or disagree with the following statement?’ 
A.! Totally agree  [5] 
B.! Tend to agree  [4] 
C.! Tend to disagree [3] 
D.! Totally disagree  [2] 
E.! Don’t Know  [1] 
 
Rational for score allocations 
The numbers represent the score allocation that represent the relative security capability effort for each of the 
corresponding responses chosen. Employees who choose "E” are obviously unaware of the evolving industrial security 
trends, and are least likely to notice or sense security anomalies on their work end, hence the least ‘1’ score allocation. 
Those who choose “D” are the next least likely sense security since they do not believe that there is any security risk 
around their work place. Their score allocation is “2”, followed by those who choose “C” with a “3” score allocation. 
However, the employees that chose “A” are most likely to notice or sense security anomalies given their initial 
acknowledgment of proliferating attacks, hence, their score allocation of “5” which implies a highest knowledge 
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capability. This is followed by those who tend to agree, choosing “B” with a “4” score allocations. Depending on the 
response chosen, the potential knowledge capability of the respondent can easily be assumed. 
 
Security skills capability survey was captured through structured questions that query the practical actions or reactions of 
respondents in the face certain cyber compromise conditions. For the skills example: 
 
‘Outside the scheduled/planned maintenance period, you receive an email or pop-up notification on your workstation 
to urgently initiate a ‘critical’ security update or patch that you are not sure has been tested but addresses certain 
security flaws on your ICS node. How would you respond to this?’ 
A.! Do not install the update/patch, and leave the security flaw      [4] 
B.! Quickly install the update/patch to enhance the security of your ICS node.    [2] 
C.! Test the acceptability of the patch yourself, and install when satisfied     [3] 
D.! Seek and verify the approval and accountability for the update/patch from technical support  [5] 
E.! Neither install or verify patch since your system is not breached and is working normal  [1] 
 
Rational for score allocations 
Employees who choose "E” obviously bear careless security attitude, pose higher cyber-attack exposure, and highly 
unlikely to respond appropriately to cyber-attacks. Those that choose “B” also retain significant likelihood susceptibility 
to malware or Trojan attacks. Those that choose “D” might present the best likelihood of reaching appropriate solution 
by their actions, as their actions can ensure proper verification and response. Those with option “A” bear slight security 
risk, especially when the updates are genuine but ignored. for appropriate and timely response to cyber-attack potential. 
Those with choice “C” offers a slight cyber-attack risk doing the job themselves without formal reporting that could be 
helpful to others, but might proffer a better and suitable operational solution for the company. Similarly, depending on 
the response chosen, the potential skill capability of the respondent can easily be assumed. 
 
Note that the score allocations are not directly included in the questionnaire, but only coded in the internal setup, captured 
from responses and used to evaluate security capabilities after responses are collated. They are only included here for 
clearer understanding of the evaluation scheme and process proposed. Table 2 presents the summary of baseline 
definitions in line with earlier discussed capability classification ratios and groups. A minimum capability rating is 
feasible assuming that all responses for one workforce member have the same least allocation score of 1. A maximum 
capability rating is derivable if all the responses each have the highest allocation score of 5. Response bias is a typical 
issue attributed to online surveys and questionnaires. It exemplifies a phenomenon where respondents provide answers 
they consider most acceptable, or expected from them, rather than a true expression of their personal views. To avert this, 
short and precise scenario-based questions with close-ended Likert-style answers were used to avoid potentials response 
biases that can emerge from too long and unclear questions. The interval scale (1-5) implied coding of responses was 
designed to help the acquisition of more accurate responses. The answer options were mostly structured into short and 
concise sentences to forestall the difficulty of evaluating their meanings by respondents. Response bias from incomplete 
set of answers was resolved through introducing answer options. For example, the answer option “Don’t Know” was used 
to cover other possible response options not included in the interval list, to avoid getting ‘false-positive’ answers due to 
the absence of desirable options. 
 
Table 2: Scenario Baseline Definitions 
From Response Allocation Score, min = 20.00, and max = 100.00 
 Priority Class Range 
Capability Priority 
Rankings 
High Priority Range (h) 20.00 ≤ h ≤ 33.33 
Moderate Priority Range (m) 33.33 < m ≤ 66.67 
Low Priority Range (l) 66.67 < l ≤ 100.00 
 
5.3  Results Presentation 
A total of 37 industrial professionals participated in the evaluation with each having a unique identifier. The feedback 
data were collected and used to compute the knowledge, skills, and harmonised capabilities of corresponding workforce 
members using Equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively.  
 
A summarised capability-priority classification of the results is presented in Table 3. Figure 2 presents the capability 
placement chart (CPC), and Table 4 presents the CPT of the first 15 least capability (highest priority) ratings, while Figure 
3 shows a chart showing the Kc, Sc, and PSC representations of the 15 least capability (highest priority) workforce 
members. 
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5.3.1 Demographics and Reliability Testing Results 
The ages of the respondents were grouped into three: Group 1 (20-35 years), Group 2 (36-50 years), and Group 1 (51-66 
years). There were 18 respondents in Group 1, 18 in Group 2, and 1 respondent in Group 3.  The average age of the 
respondents was 36. More than half of the respondents (workforce) were between ages 30 and 40. More precisely, 48.6% 
of the sample workforce were under 35 years of age, and over three quarters (91.9%) are under 45 years of age. These 
suggest that that most of workforce evaluated were mid-age range. There were more male (33) than female (4) 
respondents, which suggests that there are potentially eight times more male than female human workers in operational 
ICS domains. Similarly, there were more OT personnel (34) than IT personnel (3), which provides an indication that that 
there are potentially more OT personnel than IT in the ICSE. 
 
Initial validity and internal consistency reliability test of the measurement scale for knowledge capability (Kc) yielded 
Cronbach’s α = 0.868, which suggests a good measure of reliability. However, a good measure of reliability for the Skills 
capability (Sc) - Cronbach’s α = 0.803 was achieved in response to the need to remove one of the questions/assessment 
case items from the skills measurement scale. This item affected the reliability of the scale, and needed to be excluded to 
achieve the minimum recommended level of reliability. A Pearson’s r data analysis of the modified data revealed a low 
positive correlation, r = 0.018 between PSC and workforce Age with significantly highly chances (0.914) of occurrence. 
This indicates a slight convergent validity, and suggests that although workforce PSC and workforce Age were two 
separate constructs that measured distinct properties about the workforce, there existed high likelihood of slight increase 
in PSC as Age increases. This means that older industrial workforce personnel were more likely to be more knowledgeable 
and skilled in security response and incident management in the ICSE. Possible influences on this correlation could be 
attributed to years of experience working within the ICS domain and the corresponding incidents that may be encountered, 
resolved, and learnt over the years.  
 
The above results coincides with the findings by Beautement et al (2016) about a positive influence of Age on employee 
security maturity levels. Other measures that indicated slightly positive correlations to PSC include: Workforce Group 
with r = 0.130, and Capability Group with r = 0.416. The likelihoods of occurrence for both measures were quite lower 
than that of Age.  The results generally aligned with Wang’s (Wang, 2013) conclusion of a positive correlations between 
directly evaluated (computational) and self-evaluated responses of workforce security evaluations. This suggested that 
measures derived from directly evaluating capabilities most often follows similar results pattern as measures from self-
evaluated responses of the same workforce. 
5.3.2 Direct Evaluation Results 
As shown in Figure 4, results indicated only 3 (8.1%) respondents from the ‘security professional’ group, and 34 (91.9%) 
came from the ‘general ICS operations group’. This potentially reflects the typical rationing of workforce members in 
the industrial environment, where there is by a greater proportion of the industrial workforce, engaging general process 
operations, than that working for the maintenance of security. The result of the normalised individual security capability 
scoring of sampled respondents, in line with the priority grouping ratios prescribed in the capability evaluation model, 
indicates that more than half of the respondents (23) representing 62.2% were classed to be of ‘low priority’ regarding 
their combined knowledge and skills conforming to the prescribed security standards and best practices. 12 (32.4%) 
respondents fell onto the ‘moderate priority’, and 2 (5.4%) fell in the ‘high priority’ group. The latter group identifies the 
respondents with high-risk weaknesses in cyber security, and which needed a quite urgent attention in terms of education 
and security capacity building. Contextually, the weakest link (WL) typically emerges from this group, and is attributed 
to the personnel with workforce ID WF014 with an approximate harmonised capability rating of 32.47 ( �. �. ,�� =���(�) = ���(���!…	���Ν) = 32.47). This workforce individual had a knowledge capability rating of 34, and a skill 
capability rating of 31.  
 
Table 3: Capability-Priority Classification for Test Scenario 
Cap. Priority Freq Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumm. 
Percent 
Low High 2 5.4 5.4 5.4 
High Low 23 62.2 62.2 67.6 
Moderate Moderate 12 32.4 32.4 100.0 
 Total 37 100.0 100.0  
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Figure 3: Workforce Capability Evaluation Placement Chart (37-User Classification) 
 
Table 4: Priority Ranking for the 15 workforce members with the lowest security capacity 
WF ID Kc  Sc PSC Priority Ratings 
WF014 34 31 32.47 High 
WF036 31 35 32.94 High 
WF035 58 50 53.85 Moderate 
WF023 64 48 55.43 Moderate 
WF018 58 58 58.00 Moderate 
WF037 60 60 60.00 Moderate 
WF034 65 57 60.87 Moderate 
WF019 66 57 61.34 Moderate 
WF016 57 67 61.80 Moderate 
WF032 71 54 61.92 Moderate 
WF004 68 63 65.45 Moderate 
WF028 70 62 65.88 Moderate 
WF013 64 69 66.45 Moderate 
WF002 59 75 66.52 Moderate 
WF031 70 64 66.93 Low 
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Figure 1: 15 Lowest Capability Workforce Representation (Kc, Sc, and PSC Contributions) 
 
In assessing the areas of potential security weaknesses inherent the workforce evaluated, the cumulative capability rating 
(CCR) of each of the security questions was evaluated. The best-case scenario represents the maximum CCR (CCRmax), 
with a value of 185, if the highest capability score of 5 is assigned by all workforce responses to a specific question. The 
CCR value for the specific question is the product of the uniform score and the number of respondents (i.e., 5 x 37 = 185). 
The worst case represents the minimum CCR (CCRmin), which is 37 (i.e. representing the scenario where a uniform score 
of 1 is obtained by all responses to a specific question). The 15 least CCR values are presented in Figure 5, the records 
indicate that the first 3 least CCRs were from the skills evaluation questions, 10 (66.67%) of the least 15 CCRs compared 
came from the skills (Sc) evaluation questions (Table 5), and only 5 (33.33%) of the least 15 CCR values came from the 
knowledge (Kc) questions (Table 6). 
 
Table 5: The Least 10 Skills Cumulative Capability Ratings (CCR) 
 Skills Capability Weakness Areas 
Question ID Questions Security Evaluation Areas 
Q37: How often do you change/review your account password assuming 
organisational security policy is in place 
Credential (Password) 
Management Policies 
Q27: How do you respond to either of the following; the mouse on your 
workstation screen begins to move around on its own and click things, or the 
controls on your monitoring station (HMI) get activated on their own? 
Malware (Virus) Attack 
Response and Controls 
Q23: How do you access and exchange files and documentations within your 
industrial system/organisation (Enterprise Management and Industrial 
networks)? 
Removable Media 
Protection 
Q40: How often are you able to detect cyber intrusions, attacks, compromise, or 
malware (virus, Trojan, spyware, etc.) when they occur on your work 
system/station (industrial equipment, computing device, network, etc). 
Malware (Virus) Attack 
detection 
Q30: Two different offices in your workplace are working to straighten out an 
error in your Single Sign-On Account (Login) Configurations and Bank 
payments details. Office 1 asks you to email your correct account details. 
You send the requested details via email to office 1, which is subsequently 
forwarded via email to office 2. Office 2 confirms to have straightened the 
error out. What do you think could be wrong here? 
Credential Management 
and email security 
Q22: How do you access and exchange files and documentations within your 
industrial system/organisation (Enterprise Management and Industrial 
networks)? 
Updates and patch 
management in ICS 
Q28: In your opinion, which of these offers a stronger and more secure password 
type to adopt? 
Credential (password) 
security deployment 
Q34: It is festivity time; you receive an electronic greeting card (e-card) to your 
work email from a friend. The mail requires you to click on the attachment 
to view the electronic card. What should you do? 
Email security (phishing) 
attack management 
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Q24: Knowing and following the channels and modes for incident reporting in the 
event of being a victim of a (suspected) cyber-attack/intrusion/infection. 
Incidence Response 
Q29: Because you are keen on enhancing your cyber security knowledge and skills, 
you subscribed to a number of free online ICS/SCADA Security Magazines. 
To activate your free subscription, you are required to register with your 
work email. One magazine asks for your year of birth, a second asks for your 
month of birth, a third asks for your mother’s maiden name. How do you 
respond to these queries? 
Identity and Privacy 
Security 
 
 
Table 6: The Least 5 Knowledge Cumulative Capability Ratings (CCR) 
 Knowledge Capability Weakness Areas 
Question ID Questions Security Evaluation Areas 
Q1: How well secure do you feel about your industrial equipment, networks, 
operations and(or) critical infrastructure against cyber vulnerabilities, 
threats and attacks? 
Security Controls 
Availability  
Q17: It is the sole responsibility of the information security department to protect 
company assets by engineering protection and proper use of information 
assets, deploying security technologies for securing industrial processes, 
and developing proper security practices for daily activities 
Proper Attribution of 
Security Responsibilities 
Q12: You have good knowledge and understanding of your duties and role 
expectation pertaining the following;  awareness and training, home and 
mobile working, configuration management, removable media protection, 
user credential security and management, incident response and 
management, privacy controls, monitoring, malware protection, audits, 
accountability, authentication and authorisation, physical and 
environmental security, and contingency planning, for the protection of 
industrial computing assets and critical infrastructures as contained in any 
of (i) CPNI Good Practice Guide, (ii) ISO/IEC 27002, (iii) IEC 62443 
(ISA-99), (iv) NIST SP 800-82 v2, (v) COBIT 5 
Awareness of respective 
Roles in Security 
Q18: Which statement best describes your knowledge of potential solutions 
available for addressing cyber security threats to ICS/SCADA infrastructure 
and(or) enterprise network? 
Knowledge of Available 
security controls 
Q2: How often do you monitor process and activity log data, and tune the usage 
statistics of your Industrial Control Systems and IT critical infrastructure? 
Security Monitoring 
Frequency 
 
Furthermore, the demographics of WF014 personality indicates an age of 29, no form of certification in information or 
cyber security, and self-rated assessment of security capability 1, which implies a least capability rating. This suggests a 
relatively young age of work and perhaps experience, considering that three-quarters of the workforce were over 30 years. 
Self-rated assessment of security capability is likely to change as this personnel’s age and experience in the ICS 
environment increases. 
 
The mean capability ratings for knowledge and skills are 69.43 and 62.97 respectively. The standard deviation for the 
knowledge capability scores is 12.39, while that of the skill capability score is 11.69. In relations to the security 
requirements adopted and evaluated, it implied that the workforce generally demonstrated higher theoretical knowledge 
than practical skills. It could also be because of the perceived lack of keenness for security skills in industrial workforce, 
who often assume that enforcing security should be solely left to the IT security specialists.  The standard deviation values 
indicated that there were slightly more capability dispersions in security knowledge than security skill amongst the 
workforce. That is, most of the workforce had very closely the same level of practical skills in ICS security than they 
were closely levelled in awareness (knowledge) of ICS Security. In general, the results suggest some measure of capability 
gaps amongst the workforce which may be influenced by their interactions, information sharing, personal capability 
enhancement engagements, and possibly organisational policies on security.  Out of the 37 workforce members; 34 
(91.9%) belonged to the General ICS operations class, 3 (8.1%) belong to ICS Security class. 36 (97.3%) did not have 
any security training or certificate, only 1 (2.7%) has a form of security training. This reflects the potential typical 
rationing of workforce members in the industrial environment. There is by far a greater proportion of the industrial 
workforce engaged with other industrial responsibilities other than the maintenance or assurance of security. 
 
5.3.3 Self-Evaluation Results 
In the aspect of self-evaluated capabilities, more than half (19) or (62.2%) rated themselves as ‘low capability’ in ICS 
security proficiencies. This contrasts with the computed capability score class that showed 2 (5.4%) respondents under 
low capability. This suggests a significant variation between individual and organisational views about security capability 
expectations, and further suggest that the respondents appear to have a higher capability rating disposition than that 
adopted by the organisation (used in the evaluation). To investigate and expound further on this capability variations, 
statistical hypothesis testing was applied with a Null assertion (A/Ho): There is no difference in priority rating levels of 
the workforce amongst the self-rated security capability groups. The self-rated security capability attributes used in the 
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evaluation tool (questionnaire) included:  1= least capability, 2= low capability, 3 = moderate capability, 4 = high 
capability, and 5 = highest capability. 
.  
Table 7: Statistical Crosstab for Security Capability by Priority Ranking 
Security Capability * Priority Ranking Crosstabulation 
 
Priority Ranking 
Total High Priority 
Low 
Priority 
Moderate 
Priority 
S
e
c
u
r
it
y
 C
a
p
a
b
il
it
y
 
Least 
Capability 
Count 2 1 1 4 
Expected 
Count 
.2 2.5 1.3 4.0 
Low 
Capability 
Count 0 12 7 19 
Expected 
Count 
1.0 11.8 6.2 19.0 
Moderate 
Capability 
Count 0 9 2 11 
Expected 
Count 
.6 6.8 3.6 11.0 
Higher 
Capability 
Count 0 1 2 3 
Expected 
Count 
.2 1.9 1.0 3.0 
Total 
Count 2 23 12 37 
Expected 
Count 
2.0 23.0 12.0 37.0 
 
Table 8: Statistical Crosstab for Workforce Group by Priority Ranking 
Workforce Group * Priority Ranking Crosstabulation 
 
Priority Ranking 
Total 
High 
Priority 
Low 
Priority 
Moderate 
Priority 
W
o
r
k
fo
r
c
e
 G
r
o
u
p
 
General ICS 
Operations 
Count 2 21 11 34 
Expected 
Count 
1.8 21.1 11.0 34.0 
Security 
Professional 
Count 0 2 1 3 
Expected 
Count 
.2 1.9 1.0 3.0 
Total 
Count 2 23 12 37 
Expected 
Count 
2.0 23.0 12.0 37.0 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Least 15 cumulative capability rating (CCR) 
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As observed in Table 7, 2 of 37 workforce members are in the high priority group, same 2 rated themselves as having 
least capability. Similarly, 23 of 37 workforce members are in low priority, and of the 23, 9 self-rated themselves as 
having moderate capability, 12 having low capability, and 1 each having least and highest capabilities. Since our work 
focuses on weakest link, focused analysis is undertaken on the least capability – high priority intersection. The row totals 
revealed 4 workforce members self-rated under least capability, the column total shows 2 workforce individuals on high 
priority ranking. A Pearson’s chi-square (x2) value of 20.431 was obtained for these statistics with a 0.002 significance 
level. The crosstab statistics in Table 8 suggests that there is a rather large difference between the count and expected 
count in the sample if all self-rated least capability workforce reactively behaved in like manner of high priority as other 
grouped workforce members. However, a 0.002 significance level on the chi-square (x2) value implies the possibility of 
rejecting the null hypothesis with only 0.2% chance of being wrong (i.e., less than 1 in 1000 chances of being wrong). 
The Null hypothesis could be rejected, and an alternative hypothesis alternative hypothesis (A/Hi): There is a difference 
in priority rating levels of the workforce amongst the self-rated security capability groups could be considered. It can 
thus be assumed that the workforce self-rated under least capability are more in high priority ranking group than in others. 
In the event of such variations, it becomes important to engage with, and determine the workforce’s view about security 
capability expectations, and work towards updating and bringing-up the seemingly low-rated organisation security rating 
benchmark for personnel to a higher acceptable level. 
 
Also, testing a second hypothesis (B/Ho) that there is no difference in priority ranking level between the general ICS 
operations and security professional workforce yielded a Pearson’s chi-square (x2) value of 0.188 with 0.910 significance 
level. The crosstab on Table 8 suggested very negligible difference between the real and expected priority ranking 
behaviours of the general ICS operations group. The security group also behaved in like manner.  As expected, the results 
in the table 8 crosstabs indicated no security professional emerged in the high priority (low capability) group. Thus, a 
0.910 significance suggests a 91% chance of being wrong if we reject the null hypothesis. This huge likelihood of being 
wrong informed our basis for not rejecting the null hypothesis that there is no difference in priority ranking level between 
the general ICS operations and security professional workforce. 
 
5.4  Discussion 
The above results suggest that irrespective of the number of high security-proficient cybersecurity professionals in the 
workforce members in an industrial control environment, the presence of other general operations ICS workforce 
members with inherently low capabilities can decrease overall organisational human-oriented security capacity. 
Circumstantially, this phenomenon follow similar patterns and disposition in prior works  (Nikolakopoulos, 2009) where 
human agents (ICS workforce members) with low security capability (knowledge and skills) ratings are likely to be weak-
links, since they pose more conspicuous targets of attacks.  
 
If all of the workforce evaluated all belong to the same organisation, then the workforce individual with identity number 
WF014 represents the security capability of the organisation. Notwithstanding the security capability strengths of all other 
workforce members, the organisation can easily be penetrated and compromised to the security and defence capability of 
WF014 workforce individual. The organisation would be considered as weakly penetrable as the capability of ID WF014, 
who in this context and based on evaluation result is considered the weakest link. This represents the straw portion of 
whatever security fences or capability enabled or imbibed in the entire workforce, and figuratively, a ‘straw’ portion in a 
brick wall suggests the weakest and most vulnerable point of breach. Reactively or proactively raising the capability 
ratings of potential weakest link (via appropriate control measures) implies raising or strengthening organisational 
security capability. Also, a low capability rating in any of knowledge or skills potentially upsets an eventual PSC, and by 
extension an organisational capability. A low capability in both attributes suggests an even worse phenomenon.  
Essentially, a workforce individual with high security knowledge rating indicates being abreast with evolving industrial 
cyber security landscape, but with low security skills rating, indicating a lack or gap in practical (responsive) proficiency 
to ensure security within his/her domain, is nearly as weak as the workforce who is skilled in responding to primordial 
cyber security threats and attacks but does not constantly keep up with updates and changes in the security landscape. 
This is a possible scenario within ICS organisations where adequate emphasis is not placed on human-factored cyber 
security assurance. This point re-echoes an earlier disposition (Beautement et al., 2016), asserting that for security 
management to be effective, it remains valuable to evaluate the impact of employee security capability, susceptibility and 
behaviour, more so, in a way that supports identifying and ranking capability and susceptibility levels, as well as common 
security weak areas. 
 
A related phenomenon is seen to play out in the contrast between self-rated and computed capabilities of the workforce. 
The outcome indicates that more industrial workforce members were more aware of cyber-attack trends and issues than 
they have the skills to respond appropriately to eventual incidences, despite that most of the workforce had not undergone 
any formal education and(or) training on security concepts, norms, and best practices, an information that would help 
them acquire appropriate knowledge and skills in the assurance of cyber security within their working environments. It 
suggests that while the organisation might feel comfortable about certain qualities and proficiency levels, personal 
workforce convictions might not represent the same opinion. This could result from a lack of updated details in emerging 
cyber security threat landscape on the part of the organisation, which is reflected in the test for old and widely known 
security capabilities. To avoid such precarious situations, organisations must continually keep abreast with the changing 
security trends, and updates evaluations in the light of those changes. Reviews and refinements of the security risk 
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landscape should be continuous to capture any new or left out changes. Comparing the two results helps the balancing of 
security efforts between organisational view and workforce view about security capability. 
 
The analysis of prime security-vulnerable areas reveals an interesting pattern inherent the workforce. The cumulative 
capability rating (CCR) of each of the security questions/parameters for all respondents can guide the identification of 
prime security knowledge and skill vulnerable areas. A lower CCR value indicates a gap or weakness in capability, and 
vice versa. It is therefore presumed that security weaknesses or vulnerabilities would typically widen or increase with 
decrease in CCR values. In the analysis of the least 15 CCR values selected, the first 3 least CCR values emerged from 
skill evaluation parameters, and 10 out of the least 15 CCR values also came from skill evaluation parameters. These 
suggest a potentially more incapacity and security gaps in skill than in knowledge of the workforce evaluated. This also 
presents a correlated perspective when compared with the overall knowledge and skill capability averages, which 
indicated a higher average security knowledge than security practical skill in the workforce. 
 
Grouping the security areas of the least 10 skill CCRs into related family of security controls reveals that the workforce 
evaluated are weak in 4 broad areas of security control. These include: Credentials (Password) Management and Security, 
Malware (Virus) Detection and Management, Removable Media and Email Security, and Patch (update) management. 
The broad areas of theoretical knowledge weaknesses include; awareness of available security control measures, and 
knowledge of self-duties and responsibilities towards overall system security. Most of the identified workforce 
vulnerability areas are in their weakest states in the security capability characterisation of the identified weakest link 
workforce individual (i.e., WF014). In this context, rather than engage all workforce members in practice training and 
awareness in all conceivable security areas, a strategic, cost, time, and resource-effective implementation of control 
measures for enhancing cyber security assurance would involve focussed awareness and practical training of selected 
purported weaker (more vulnerable) workforce members in the ‘low capability’ areas enumerated. Security assurance 
improvement should involve inculcating security proficiencies (knowledge and skills) that are observed to be lacking, as 
it may be a waste of time, money, and other resource giving the workforce what they already have. 
 
It is apparent that a single human-factor attribute such as security knowledge alone does not provide sufficient landscape 
and information to effectively characterise and represent a human agent’s security aptitude. Industrial organisations need 
to cultivate and maintain a culture of continually improving their corporate security posture and capacity through 
evaluating and growing the security capacity of their employees (workforce).  This must be driven by an understanding 
that effective security starts and ends with each human-agent (workforce) involved with their industrial infrastructure, 
processes, operations, and services. A better representation of security capability can be obtained by combining multiple 
human-factor (workforce) attributes such as knowledge and skills as demonstrated in the results obtained. A low capability 
rating in any of knowledge or skills potentially upsets an eventual PSC, and by extension an organisational capability. 
Thus, workforce security capability should be a priority for organisation, for when technical security capacities are 
ineffective, fail, or non-available, the security capability of the human agents can provide the last line of dense. 
 
 
6  Conclusion and Future Work 
Amidst evolving security trends that places human industrial actors as prime vectors of industrial cyber-attacks, human-
factored security efforts are required to manage and control the menace of prevailing attacks. Considering that cyber 
security knowledge and skills capabilities of the industrial workforce (people) is crucial and strategic towards building a 
more effective and cybersecurity-compliant workforce. Inordinate records demonstrate that most successes in the security 
compromises of industrial control system and network environments have target and exploited the security capability 
weaknesses of the human (people) constituents of industrial/operational environments, especially those with low 
aptitudes. Securing ICS domains and networks is no longer the sole responsibility of cybersecurity professionals within 
the industries, it is a responsibility shared by all workforce members in the industry. Particularly, the non-security-savvy 
industrial operations personnel needs to be considerably knowledgeable and skilled in the act of appropriate and effective 
security behaviours and responses, as they are currently more targeted than the security experts. 
 
Directed cyber-attacks on the workforce become effective due to a couple of reasons; like weak or lack of sufficient cyber 
security knowledge and skills, negligence, misinformation, all of which can spur inappropriate behaviour (actions and 
inactions) enough to neutralise cyber-malicious actions. Technology-based security solutions alone may not be able to 
enforce the desired security in the system if the people constituents fail to recognise and maintain their roles in overall 
organisation/system security. A lack of cyber security knowledge is as bad as a lack of cyber security skill, and it is a 
matter of an organisation and(or) system being as strong as its weakest link. Potentially, the weaker links in the 
system/organisation, the lower the potential security capacity or posture. One way to reduce organisation security 
vulnerability or risk potential is to enhance security capability through improving security awareness and training, 
identifying specific personnel with security weaknesses, and the specific knowledge or training needs. Humans will 
always be in the loop (directly or indirectly), and their competencies would seldom come into play towards achieving 
certain security objectives. The application of systematic and strategic analysis of workforce security capacities can spur 
the ICS-driven organisations towards good and well-informed cyber hygiene, and help maintain effective responses to 
possible cyber security factors, through removing or reducing weak links in the system. Human-factored security 
evaluations is a step towards building robust and resilient cybersecurity capacity in the people elements of a digital system.  
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The research provides an approach to identify the security-compliant weakest link in a group of workforce members. It 
proffers the first line of defence against potential security threats by activating security consciousness in the workforce. 
It also offers a starting point for security evaluators and top management towards understanding individual workforce 
security postures, in relations to defined security objectives and expected baselines. It can (i) help analyse and reveal 
potential variations in security capability among the workforce of organisations, (ii) be used to assess organisations’ 
workforce over or under performance in security capacity, and (iii) persuade and promote an up-to-date disposition in 
security expectations and requirements, (iv) aid the identification of cyber security threats and vulnerabilities that are 
unique to their environments. Overall, the evaluation approach proffers a means of measuring the effectiveness of 
continuous cybersecurity control and remediation efforts, and speeds-up problem-solving. It also demonstrates potential 
to guide organisations into adopting cost-efficient means of thinning and appropriating security remediation outlines to 
meet evolving needs, security assurance scopes, and resources without undue wastes or redundancies. A limitation of the 
proposed model points to subjectivity where score allocations for responses in the evaluation tool rely on expert 
evaluations of perceived risks attributed to any response disposition. It would be interesting to explore a way of achieving 
the same allocation via a standardised evaluation approach and tool to eliminate high-level subjectivity and potential 
inconsistencies in value allocations. Other future work in this area also includes developing an automated evaluation tool 
that can be used to replicate and quicken the processes outlined in the proposed approach. It would be interesting to 
consider incorporating further human attributes like cognitive and behavioural patterns and characteristics to the 
evaluation scheme. Work will be done on the incorporating the human-factored attributes into a larger risk-based critical 
impact point method for enhancing cyber security assurance. 
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